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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Travis L. Ward appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing
his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ward pied guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. (See R., p.108;
#38733 PSI.

1)

The district court did not order a new psychosexual or

psychological evaluation prior to sentencing. (#38722 Tr.,2 p.16, L.8- p.17, L.7.)
However, several previously-conducted evaluations were attached to Ward's
presentence investigation report. (See PSI.) The district court imposed a unified
sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed. (Id.) On appeal, Ward alleged his
sentence was excessive, but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court.

State v. Ward, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 319, Docket No. 38733

(Idaho App. January 13, 2012).
Ward filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.1-11.) Ward
asserted three claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; (2)
Fifth Amendment violation based upon "having been made to act as a witness
against himself' and "not having counsel present during all phases of
evaluations,

interrogations;" and (3) "Violation of petitioner[']s Fourteenth

Amendment rights to Due Process and Equal Protection clauses."

(R., p.6.)

1 The

district court took judicial notice of the presentence report and attachments
from Ward's underlying failure to register case. (R., p.108.)
2

The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the reporter's transcripts of the
entry of plea and sentencing hearings from Ward's underlying failure to register
case. (8/26/13 Order.)
1

Ward's ineffective assistance of counsel claim contained three sub-claims: (a)
trial counsel failed to "keep [him] appraised [sic] of all aspects of the case or to
make [himself] readily available during critical evaluations"; (b) appellate counsel
failed to adequately communicate with him; and (c) trial counsel failed to inform
him of his Fifth Amendment rights with regard to psychological or psychosexual
evaluations. (R., p.7.) In an accompanying affidavit, Ward also asserted that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the district court order a new
psychological evaluation in connection with his new failure to register conviction
(R, p.10.)
The district court appointed counsel to represent Ward.

(R., pp.33-34.)

Appointed counsel filed a memorandum in support of Ward's petition. (R., pp.4348.) The memorandum clarified Ward's petition, stating, "[Ward] has alleged that
his trial/appellate counsel were ineffective and thereby deprived Petitioner of his
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights." (R., p.44.)
The state filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal, in which it
asserted Ward failed to allege facts that demonstrated either deficiency or
prejudice with regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims expressly
raised in Ward's petition.

(R., pp.49-53, 65-97.)

The state also liberally

construed Ward's petition and supplemental filings as asserting that Ward's trial
counsel was additionally ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of a 1989
psychological evaluation which was attached to the PSI. (R., p.73.) The state
moved for the summary dismissal of this claim as well. (Id.)

2

The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal. (R.,
pp.107-124.)

The court addressed both the ineffective assistance of counsel

claims expressly raised in Ward's petition, as well as the claim that Ward's trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's consideration of
the 1989 psychological evaluation. (Id.) Which respect to each claim, the district
court concluded that Ward failed to raise a prima facie case with regard to the
applicable Strickland standard.

3

(Id.) Ward timely appealed. (R., pp.125-128.)

3

Pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), a postconviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

3

ISSUES
Ward states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Should the district court's order of summary dismissal be
reversed because the court dismissed on grounds other than
those argued by the state in its motion?

2.

Should the district court's order of summary dismissal also be
reversed because the order did not address Mr. Ward's stand
alone Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims?

3.

Should the district court's order of summary dismissal as to
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim also be reversed
because Mr. Ward did raise a genuine issue of material fact
both as to the deficient performance of trial counsel and as to
prejudice?

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-6)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Ward failed to show the district court summarily dismissed his postconviction petition on grounds entirely independent of those set forth by
the state in its motion for summary dismissal?

2.

Has Ward failed to show that the district court was required to specifically
address Ward's stand-alone Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims
where it granted the state's motion to dismiss in its entirety?

3.

Has Ward failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Ward Has Failed To Show The District Court Summarily Dismissed His PostConviction Petition On Grounds Entirely Independent Of Those Set Forth By The
State In Its Motion For Summary Dismissal

A.

Introduction
Ward contends that the district court summarily dismissed his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims on grounds other than those set forth by the state in
its motion for dismissal, thereby depriving him of required notice.
brief, pp.6-8.)

(Appellant's

However, a review of the record reveals that the district court

dismissed Ward's ineffective assistance of counsel claims on substantially similar
grounds as set forth by the state - that Ward failed to allege facts satisfying the
applicable Strickland standard. Further, even if the court dismissed the petition
on entirely independent grounds, any such error is harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).

C.

The District Court Dismissed Ward's Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Claims On Substantially Similar Grounds As Set Forth By The State
The district court may, on a party's motion or its own initiative, summarily

dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-4906; Ridgley v. State, 148

5

Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (Ct. App. 2010). The procedure for summary
dismissal is equivalent to that for a summary judgment motion under I.R.C.P. 56.
Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675, 227 P.3d at 929 (citation omitted). Thus, dismissal is
appropriate on determination that no "genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file."

&

Where the district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition on
its own motion, without motion from the state, a petitioner is entitled to notice of
the basis for the dismissal, and 20 days to respond.

I.C. § 19-4906(b). If the

state moves to dismiss, the motion serves as notice for which petitioner may
respond under IC. § 19-4906(c). Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d
123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009). The petitioner is entitled to a twenty-day period of time
to respond to the state's motion. State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 489, 632
P.2d 676, 678 (1981); Isaak v. State, 132 Idaho 369, 370, 972 P.2d 1097, 1098
(Ct. App. 1999).

If the district court dismisses on grounds other than those

articulated in the state's motion, the petitioner must be given additional notice
and an opportunity to respond pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b).

&

In Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 236 P.3d 1277 (2010), the Idaho Supreme
Court clarified the distinction in post-conviction appeals between a claim of
insufficient notice of the grounds for summary dismissal, and a claim that there
was no notice of the grounds for summary dismissal.

An appellant may not

challenge the sufficiency of the notice contained in the state's motion for
summary disposition and accompanying memoranda for the first time on appeal.

19..:

at 521-522, 236 P.3d at 1281-1282 (citing DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,

6

602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009)). An appellant may, however, assert for the first
time on appeal that he did not receive any notice of dismissal, i.e., that the district
court dismissed the petitioner's claims on grounds entirely independent from the
ground he was provided notice of in the state's motion and supporting briefs.

kl

In Kelly, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to show
the district court dismissed the post-conviction claims on entirely independent
grounds where the state provided the applicable Strickland ineffective assistance
of counsel standard, cited Idaho law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel
claims; and where the district court held that "Kelly has not provided specific facts
to show that [Kelly's attorney's] behavior fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation, and that such a claim was 'unsupported by the
record."'

kl

at 522-524, 236 P.3d at 1282-1284.

The Court also held that

"[w]hen a trial court summarily dismisses an application for post-conviction relief
based in part on the arguments presented by the State, this is sufficient to meet
the notice requirements."

kl

at 523, 236 P.3d at 1283 (emphasis in original,

citations omitted)).
In the present case, because Ward failed to preserve any claim that the
state's motion to dismiss provided insufficient notice of summary dismissal, he
must meet the more stringent standard of showing that the district court
dismissed the claims in question on entirely independent grounds than set forth
by the state. Ward cannot make such a showing.
In his post-conviction petition and supporting affidavit, Ward asserted his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to keep him apprised of all aspects of the

7

case, failing to inform him of his Fifth Amendment rights regarding pre-sentence
evaluations, and for failing to request a new psychological evaluation. (R., pp.111.)
In its response and motion to dismiss, prior to discussing Ward's claims
individually, the state cited the applicable Strickland standard and cited Idaho law
relating to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

(R., pp.69-71.)

The state

summarized that Ward "has raised no genuine issues of material fact, which, if
resolved in the applicant's favor would entitle the applicant to the requested
relief" under the applicable Strickland standard as to any of his claims. (R., p.74.)
In addition to addressing the claims expressly raised in Ward's petition and
affidavit, the state liberally construed Ward's prose petition as also asserting that
Ward's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of a 1989
psychological evaluation that was attached to Ward's PSl. 4 (R., p.73.)
Specifically, the state argued: (1) the grounds for relief expressly asserted
in Ward's petition were too bare and conclusory to substantiate a response; (2)
Ward could not show his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his

Despite this liberal interpretation of Ward's petition, the state submits that
Ward's petition and supporting affidavit do not allege that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the district court's consideration of a 1989
psychological evaluation. Ward's appointed counsel never amended the petition
to include this claim. "It is clearly established under Idaho law that a cause of
action not raised in the party's pleadings may not be considered on summary
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal." Kelly, 149 Idaho
at 523-524, 236 P.3d at 1283-1284. The state thus asserts, in the alternative, that
Ward was not entitled to notice on any claim that he did not raise in his petition,
and that the district court's summary dismissal of the claim in question may be
affirmed on the ground that the district court erred by considering the claim in the
first place.
4

8

Fifth Amendment rights with regard to any post-plea evaluation where he did not
participate in any such evaluation, and where the guilty plea advisory form
indicated Ward understood his rights; (3) in light of trial counsel's demonstrated
strategy at the sentencing hearing, Ward failed to allege facts establishing that
counsel was objectively deficient in failing to request a new psychological
evaluation, or that any prejudice resulted; (4) because Estrada v. State, 143
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), 5 is not retroactive, Ward's trial counsel could not
have successfully challenged the court's consideration of the 1989 evaluation;
and (5) any attempt to challenge the effectiveness of counsel who represented
Ward in the 1989 rape proceedings was untimely. (R., pp.65-74.)
The district court dismissed Ward's post-conviction petition on grounds
substantially similar to those set forth by the state.

The court generally

concluded that Ward failed to allege facts that would entitle him to relief under the
Strickland standard as to any of his claims. (R., pp.107-121.) Specifically, the
court concluded: (1) Ward failed to provide any evidentiary support for his claims
that his attorney failed to keep him apprised of the case, or that counsel's
decision not to request a new evaluation constituted deficient performance; (2)
Ward failed to allege facts demonstrating that his counsel's failure to challenge
the 1989 psychological evaluation constituted deficient performance because
counsel did not have a Sixth Amendment obligation to investigate whether the
prior evaluation was conducted in an unconstitutional manner, and because

5

In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a defendant has the right to
obtain accurate advice from counsel about his right to remain silent and decline
participation in a psychosexual evaluation.
9

Estrada is not retroactive; and that in any event, Ward also failed to establish
prejudice because the district court did not rely on the 1989 evaluation at
sentencing. (Id.)
The district court thus dismissed Ward's petition on substantially similar, if
not precisely identical, grounds as set forth by the state.

Because Ward has

failed to show that the district court dismissed his ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims on grounds entirely independent of those set forth by the state, he
has failed to show that he was deprived of required notice.

D.

Even If The District Court Dismissed The Petition On Entirely Independent
Grounds, Any Such Error Is Harmless
If a petitioner is "not left with an 'invisible target' and is able to respond in a

meaningful way to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss," then any lack of
adequate notice is harmless. Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 422-423, 128 P.3d
948, 958-959 (Ct. App. 2005); see also Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 671,
152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Nevertheless, if Franck-Teel's response to the
state's motion for summary dismissal reveals that she understood the basis for
dismissal. .. , then we will conclude that the inadequacy of notice was harmless
error. ") .
In this case, to the extent the district court's expressed rationale for
dismissal was so distinct from the grounds set forth by the state as to render the
court's order a sua sponte dismissal, any such error is harmless. Ward had full
opportunity to present evidence and argument as to how he could satisfy the
deficiency and prejudice prongs of Strickland.

10

Further, Ward has not attempted

to describe what type of argument or evidence he would have presented if only
he had more precise notice of the grounds for the district court's dismissal of
these claims.
Because Ward was not left with an "invisible target," and had the
opportunity to respond in a meaningful way to the state's argument that he had
failed to establish a prima facie case regarding the Strickland standard as to any
of his claims, any error regarding required notice of the summary dismissal of
those claims is harmless.

11.
Ward Has Failed To Show That The District Court Was Required To Specifically
Address Ward's Stand-Alone Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment Claims Where It
Granted The State's Motion To Dismiss In Its Entirety

A

Introduction
Ward contends that the district court erred by failing to consider his stand-

alone Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

(Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.)

Ward's argument fails because the record reveals that the state moved for the
dismissal of these claims, and the district court granted the state's motion in its
entirely.
The district court's dismissal order may also be affirmed on any several
alternate. First, Ward abandoned these stand-alone claims in his memorandum
in support of his petition. Further, Ward failed to make use of avenues by which
he could have challenged the district court's dismissal order below. Finally, even
if the district court erred in failing to expressly address these claims, no remand
is necessary because the record reveals an obvious answer to the relevant

11

question, in that Ward failed to support the stand-alone claims with any evidence
or argument.

B.

The District Court Was Not Required To Expressly Address Ward's StandAlone Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment Claims
In his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, Ward asserted two claims in

addition to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Ward asserted: "(b)

Violations of the Fifth Amendment of [sic] having been made to act as a witness
against himself, by not having counsel present during all phases of evaluations,
interrogations; [and] (c) Violations of petitioner['s] Fourteenth Amendment right to
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses." (R., p.6.) Ward did not provide any
explanation, argument, or evidence relating to these claims. (See R., pp.5-11.)
Ward's subsequently appointed counsel filed a memorandum in support of
the petition, which clarified that Ward was "alleg[ing] that his trial/appellate
counsel were ineffective and thereby deprived Petitioner of his Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights."

(R., p.44.) Ward's counsel did not attempt to

argue the merits of either of the stand-alone Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims. (See id.)
In its motion for summary dismissal of Ward's petition, the state argued
that the asserted grounds for relief in Ward's petition were "too bare and
conclusory to substantiate a response." (R., p.66.) The state went on to respond
to the "clarified position" set for in Ward's counsel's memorandum. (R., pp.6974.)

The state requested the district court to "dismiss the petition." (R., p.74

(emphasis omitted)).

When the district court granted the state's motion (R.,

12

pp.107-121), it thus dismissed Ward's petition, and all the claims contained
within.
Ward has cited no authority standing for the proposition that a district court
must expressly address each post-conviction claim when granting a party's
motion for summary dismissal. Neither of the cases relied on by Ward - Dawson
v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380, 234 P.3d 699, 704 (2010), nor
Miramar Hotel Corp. v. Frank B. Hall & Co. of California, 163 Cal.App.3d 1126
(1985), stand for this proposition. In Dawson, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
the district court abused its discretion by failing to rule on the plaintiff's motion for
relief from judgment. Dawson, 149 at 380, 234 P.3d at 704. In Miramar Hotel
Corp., a California appellate court held that the trial court erred by failing to issue
a statement of decision where a party had timely moved for one pursuant to state
law. Miramar Hotel Corp, 163 Cal.App.3d 1126 Neither case is applicable to the
present one.

In the present case, The district court did not fail to rule on any

motion, but instead considered and granted the state's motion for summary
dismissal of Ward's petition. Ward did not move to amend or otherwise challenge
the judgment.

Therefore, Ward has failed to show the district court erred by

declining to expressly address each of his claims.
In the alternative, the district court was not required to expressly address
these claims because Ward abandoned them in the course of the post-conviction
proceedings.

In his memorandum of support, by explaining that he was

"alleg[ing] that his trial/appellate counsel were ineffective and thereby deprived
Petitioner of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights," Ward clarified

13

his petition and consolidated these claims.

Ward did not attempt to allege or

present evidence for any stand-alone Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claim in
any subsequent affidavit or other filing. Ward therefore abandoned those standalone claims, and the district court did not err by failing to expressly address
them.
Further, Ward failed to make use of other avenues by which he could have
challenged the district court's dismissal order below.

See I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(8)

(governing motions for reconsideration); I.R.C.P. 52(b) (governing motions to
amend judgments or to make additional findings); I.R.C.P. 59(e) (governing
motions for relief from judgment). The Idaho Court of Appeals has encouraged
the utilization of these rules where petitioners assert procedural errors in postconviction proceedings, to give the court an opportunity to take prompt corrective
actions, or to provide a rationale for its decisions that may be evaluated on
appeal. See Isaak v. State, 132 Idaho 369, 370 n. 2, 972 P.2d 1097, 1098 n. 2
(Ct. App. 1999).
Finally, the absence of express findings and conclusions may be
disregarded by the appellate court where the record is clear and yields an
obvious answer to the relevant question. Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 497,
700 P.2d 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1985); (citing Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103
Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982)). In this case, Ward's stand-alone Fifth
Amendment and Fourteenth amendment claims, as pied in his petition, were, as
the state argued in its motion for summary dismissal, "too bare and conculsory to
substaniate a response." (See R., p.66.) In his petition and supporting affidavit,

14

Ward does not even specify what "evaluation" or "interrogation" at which he was
allegedly deprived the presence of counsel. Further, the petition and supporting
affidavit is completely devoid of any details or context regarding Ward's
Fourteenth Amendment claim.

Because the bare and conculsory nature of these

claims yield an obvious answer to the relevant question of whether summary
dismissal was appropriate, this Court may decline to vacate the district court's
dismissal order, even if the district court erred by failing to expressly address
these claims.
In the alternative, should this Court find that the district court committed
reversible error by failing to specifically address each of Ward's claims, it should
vacate the dismissal order and remand the case with instructions for the court to
rule on the state's motion to dismiss with regard to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims. Through the state's motion, Ward has already been placed
on notice that the district court may dismiss those claims on the grounds that
they are bare and conculsory, and thus do not allege facts which, if true, would
entitle Ward to relief.
By clarifying the nature of his claim in his post-petition briefing, Ward
abandoned his stand-alone Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. This Court
should therefore affirm the district court's denial of Ward's petition for postconviction relief.

15

111.
Ward Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim

A.

Introduction
Ward contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claims

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the district court's
apparent utilization of Ward's 1989 psychological evaluation at sentencing.
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-13.) However, a review of the record reveals that Ward
failed to allege facts demonstrating either that his trial counsel was deficient, or
that he was prejudiced by any deficiency under the applicable Strickland
standard.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).

C.

Ward Failed To Allege Facts Demonstrating Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the

16

claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the
court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho
797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, even if
true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief.

kl (citing

Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho

865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1989)). "Allegations contained in the application
are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

kl
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally
deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there
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is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718
P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248
(Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760
P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244
(Ct. App. 1999). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts,
do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman
v. State, 125 Idaho 644,649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994).
In this case, Ward asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to challenge the 1989 psychological evaluation that was attached to his new
presentence investigation.

Even assuming Ward properly pied this claim, 6 he

failed to make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Ward
has failed to allege facts, which if true, establish either deficient performance or
prejudice under Strickland.
With regard to deficient performance, it would have been contrary to the
strategy of Ward's counsel at sentencing to attempt to shield the district court
from a decades-old psychological evaluation. At the sentencing hearing, Ward's
counsel referenced Ward's troubled past, but argued that he had made great
improvements in recent years, and had successfully complied with probation for

6

As discussed above, it does not appear that Ward actually raised this claim in
his post-conviction petition. However, the state and the district court both
addressed it.
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a period of time. (#38733 Tr., p.31, L.1 - p.35, L.18.) Thus, Ward's counsel's
demonstrated strategy was to readily acknowledge the life difficulties that were
described in Ward's earlier evaluations, but to emphasize Ward's improvement in
the subsequent two decades. Ward did not attempt to show that this strategy
constituted objectively deficient performance.
Additionally, Ward cannot show that the Sixth Amendment required his
counsel to investigate the circumstances of the 1989 evaluation to determine
whether any of Ward's rights were violated. As the district court recognized (R.,
pp.114-116), trial counsel does not generally have a professional obligation "to
investigate his client's prior convictions to identify some constitutional infirmity in
those cases, even where that case was used to enhance his present sentence."
See Lackawanna County District Attorney, et al. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 294, 403-404
(2001 ).

The same reasoning applies to the present case.

An attorney is not

required to investigate his client's prior evaluations to identify some constitutional
infirmity, especially where, as here, Ward did not allege that the 1989 evaluation,
or any district court utilization of it, actually violated any specific right.
Finally, any attempt by Ward's counsel to object to the presence of the
1989 evaluation in the presentence report would have been unsuccessful. The
Idaho Supreme Court has noted, in dicta, that Estrada "did not announce a new
rule of law entitled to retroactive effect." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 46, 218
P.3d 388, 390 (2009).

Ward has failed to cite any authority supporting the

proposition that a district court may not consider pre-Estrada evaluations in
sentencing determinations.
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Ward also failed to allege facts demonstrating prejudice.

As the district

court concluded (R., pp .119-120), there is no evidence in the record that the
court considered Ward's 1989 evaluation in making its sentencing determination.
While the district court referenced Ward's "psychological evaluations," and the
fact that they were "concerning" (#38722 Tr., p.41, Ls.2-11), Ward's PSI
contained at least seven different evaluations dating back to 1986, as well as the
PSI from Ward's 1989 rape conviction, and a report from the jurisdictional review
committee.

(See generally #38733 PSI.)

Ward cannot show that he was

prejudiced by any particular evaluation ordered in conjunction with any previous
criminal case. Nor has Ward pointed to anything particularly prejudicial from his
1989 evaluation that was not merely cumulative to the information contained in
other evaluations.
Ward failed to allege facts, which if true, demonstrate either that his trial
counsel's performance was deficient, or that any such deficiency resulted in
prejudice.

He has therefore failed to show that the district court erred in

summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Ward's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 31st day of March, 2014

...

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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